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MARY MARING: A ROLE MODEL FOR A JURIST 
 GERALD W. VANDEWALLE  
During her tenure on the North Dakota Supreme Court, Justice Maring 
made a lasting impact on our judicial system.  This includes her efforts to 
eliminate gender disparity and bias in judicial proceedings, reform our 
judicial system’s employment policies, and act as a driving force in the 
creation and implementation of the North Dakota Juvenile Drug Court 
system.  Through her efforts, North Dakota now serves one of our state’s 
most vulnerable populations by giving treatment to non-violent offenders 
and ending the cycle of addiction. 
Justice Maring’s passionate advocacy for disadvantaged groups is only 
overshadowed by her well-reasoned and imposing body of jurisprudence.  
While she and I disagreed on occasion, I was impressed by her deliberate 
and contemplative approach to the law.  Justice Maring was compassionate 
to the parties before the Court, but understood the effect her decisions could 
have in the future and was mindful to uphold the rule of law above all else.  
Her consistent foresight in opinions exemplified the best of our legal 
profession.  I appreciate the North Dakota Law Review providing me an 
opportunity to revisit some of the many opinions penned by Justice Maring 
and to illustrate how her scholarship and deliberation has impacted North 
Dakota jurisprudence. 
One of Justice Maring’s most well cited cases,1 recognized by the 
United States Supreme Court,2 demonstrates her keen mind and foresight in 
grappling with preeminent legal problems.  In Hoff, Justice Maring’s 
opinion centered on enforcement of visitation rights by grandparents against 
a child’s natural mother.  Our Court held unconstitutional the 1993 version 
of North Dakota Century Code section 14-09-05.1, which provided 
grandparents of an unmarried minor must be given visitation rights to the 
minor child unless the trial court found visitation was not in the best interest 
 
 Chief Justice, North Dakota Supreme Court.  I thank my judicial clerk, Justin Hagel, for his 
assistance on this article.  
1.  Hoff v. Berg, 1999 ND 115, 595 N.W.2d 285.  
2.  Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 70 (2000) (citing Hoff v. Berg, 595 N.W.2d 285, 291-92 
(N.D. 1999)).  
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of the minor, and visitation rights of grandparents were presumed to be in 
the best interest of the minor child.3 
Justice Maring’s analysis drew on extensive research of United States 
Supreme Court precedent, North Dakota constitutional interpretation, and 
holdings from sister jurisdictions in determining the extent of a natural 
parent’s fundamental liberty interest in raising his or her children.4  In 
applying strict scrutiny to this fundamental right, the state has the burden of 
proving a compelling circumstance to justify governmental intervention in 
denying parents the ability to decide with whom their children may 
associate.5  Neither the state, nor the appellant, established a compelling 
interest justifying a presumption that grandparent visitation outweighs 
parents’ fundamental liberty interest in controlling with whom their 
children associate.6  While sympathetic to the plight of grandparents, 
Justice Maring remained mindful of the rule of the law and suggested a 
more narrowly tailored visitation statute under the due process clause of the 
United States and North Dakota Constitutions.7  The ultimate result held the 
law unconstitutional and lead to an amendment to the North Dakota 
Century Code section 14-09-05.1 to meet the standard established in the 
opinion.8 
One year later, the United States Supreme Court would approvingly 
cite Justice Maring’s determination that grandparent visitation statutes must 
be constructed to serve the interest of parents’ fundamental right to care, 
custody, and control of their children, including whom they associate with.9  
In a case similar to Hoff, the United States Supreme Court, affirming the 
Washington Supreme Court, struck down a Washington state statute10 
granting third-party visitation to a child against a parent’s wishes if 
visitation was found to be in the best interest of the child.11  The superior 
court had interpreted the statute as creating a presumption that grandparent 
visitation was in the best interest of the child.12  The court of appeals 
reversed and dismissed the petition, and the Washington Supreme Court 
 
3.  N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-05.1 (1993).  
4.  Hoff, ¶¶ 8-11, 595 N.W.2d at 288-89. 
5.  Id. ¶ 16, 595 N.W.2d at 292. 
6.  Id. ¶¶ 17-18. 
7.  Id. ¶ 18. 
8.  See N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-05.1 (2001).  
9.  Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 70 (2000) (citing Hoff v. Berg, 595 N.W.2d 285, 291-92 
(N.D. 1999)).  
10.  WASH. REV. CODE § 26.10.160(3) (1989).  
11.  Troxel, 530 U.S. at 75. 
12.  Id. at 69.  
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upheld the reversal.13  While citing Hoff, and applying similar reasoning, 
the United States Supreme Court held the statute unconstitutional, finding it 
to be an infringement of parents’ fundamental right to care and control of 
their child under the Due Process Clause of the United States 
Constitution.14 
Justice Maring also advocated for the presumption of innocence before 
the law and was unshakeable in her resolve to protect the rights of the 
accused from prejudice or unlawful restraint.  In a case of first impression 
before our Court, and one which demonstrates Justice Maring’s 
commitment to constitutional protections, we determined a North Dakota 
juvenile court violated an accused’s due process rights by refusing to 
remove his restraints during an adjudicatory hearing.15  The case involved a 
juvenile who was found delinquent based upon his commission of burglary, 
robbery, and disorderly conduct.16  During the delinquency hearing, the 
juvenile was shackled and requested removal of his handcuffs.17  The 
presiding judicial referee denied the request, deferring to the policy of the 
sheriff’s office.18  The accused appealed the referee’s order arguing, among 
other issues, a denial of constitutional right to a fair hearing and due process 
for wearing restraints.19 
Justice Maring’s opinion extended the right of an adult defendant to 
appear in court free from physical restraint to juvenile hearings during both 
guilt and sentencing proceedings.20  Relying on United States Supreme 
Court precedent and application of constitutional protections in other states, 
Justice Maring outlined the standard by which a trial court must determine 
shackling is required.21  The opinion also places the burden on the state to 
prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, any shackling error did not contribute to 
a verdict.22 
Justice Maring’s lasting impact on our body of law also encompasses 
domestic relations and custody disputes.  One important case demonstrates 
 
13.  Id. at 62.  
14.  Id. at 72-75.  
15.  Interest of R.W.S., 2007 ND 37, ¶ 17, 728 N.W.2d 326, 331. 
16.  Id. ¶ 2, 728 N.W.2d at 328. 
17.  Id. 
18.  Id.   
19.  Id. ¶ 7.  
20.  Id. ¶ 17, 728 N.W.2d at 331.  
21.  Id. ¶ 18 (requiring specific findings as to the accused’s record, temperament, the 
desperateness of his situation; the security situation in the courtroom and courthouse; the 
accused’s physical condition; and whether there was an adequate means of providing security that 
was less prejudicial).  
22.  Id. ¶ 16. 
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her efforts to provide fair consideration of both parties during a custody 
dispute, while ensuring a child’s best interest remains paramount.  In Stout 
v. Stout,23 Justice Maring’s opinion clarified prior case law on the factors a 
district court must consider in a custodial parent’s request for removal of a 
child from North Dakota.24  Our Court reversed a district court’s denial of a 
request to relocate a child from North Dakota to Arkansas based on its 
erroneous view of the “best interest of the child” factors.25 
While North Dakota policy primarily considers the “best interest of the 
child” in determining removal, the factors in evaluating whether the move 
is in “the best interest of the child” were not clearly outlined prior to this 
case.26  In a detailed review, Justice Maring examined the national trend 
evaluating the jurisdictional move of a child, specifically referenced state 
statutes similar to North Dakota, weighed applicable standards of law, and 
established the following four-part test in determining whether relocation to 
another jurisdiction is proper: 
1.  The prospective advantages of the move in improving the 
custodial parent’s and child’s quality of life. 
2.  The integrity of the custodial parent’s motives for relocation. 
3.  The integrity of the non-custodial parent’s motives for 
opposing the move, particularly the extent such opposition is 
intended to secure a financial advantage with respect to continuing 
child support. 
4.  Whether there is a realistic opportunity for visitation which can 
provide an adequate basis for preserving and fostering the  




This test takes into account the unique issues presented when 
determining the “best interest of the child” in relocation cases.  Parental 
visitation encompasses the interests of the entire family unit, as visitation 
between a child and parent is necessary to maintain a healthy and loving 
relationship.  Balancing the interests of the family requires weighing 
monetary and emotional concerns, and often trial courts are unable to 
satisfy all parties.28 
 
23.  1997 ND 61, 560 N.W.2d 903.  
24.  Id. ¶¶ 33-34, 560 N.W.2d at 913-14. 
25.  Id. ¶ 8, 560 N.W.2d at 906.   
26.  Id. ¶¶ 9-13, 560 N.W.2d at 906-08. 
27.  Id. ¶ 19, 560 N.W.2d at 911. 
28.  Id. ¶¶ 29-30, 560 N.W.2d at 912. 
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While later restated,29 the standard outlined in Justice Maring’s opinion 
appropriately considers the best interest of the child in the context of 
encouraging visitation of both parents while not denying a child the benefits 
any out-of-state move may provide.  Her approach to the law is illustrated 
by this test.  The opinion is highly contemplative, thorough in its research 
of our body of law, and it takes a big-picture look to future parties and the 
effect this standard would have on their lives. 
These examples, along with her dedicated service to our judicial 
system, place Justice Maring among the finest jurists I have known.  While 
we did not always agree on the law, we never allowed our professional 
disagreement to interfere with our service to the public, and I respected 
Justice Maring’s high quality work even when we were not of one mind.  I 
hold her in the highest regard as a colleague and professional.  I’m 




29.  See Hawkinson v. Hawkinson, 1999 ND 58, ¶ 9, 591 N.W.2d 144, 147 (restating factor 
four).  
